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THE NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE ON TRIAL
Keaton Barnes*
INTRODUCTION
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are
created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with
certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life,
Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these
rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving
their just powers from the consent of the governed, That
whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of
these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish
it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on
such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to
them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and
Happiness.1

In 1786, a group composed of ex-military and farmers
sought to take over the seat of government in Massachusetts in a
coup later known as Shays’s Rebellion.2 This distressing event
occurred because the people in rural areas of Massachusetts felt
that they were not properly represented by the “elites” in more
densely populated areas.3 Before that group, small, radical groups
of Colonists led a rebellion against Britain’s vast empire for
mainly the same reasons.4 The phrase “no taxation without
*
J.D. Candidate, University of Arkansas School of Law, 2022. Articles Editor of the
Arkansas Law Review, 2021-2022. The author extends thanks to the faculty and staff of the
University of Arkansas, specifically Professor Mark Killenbeck, as well as to the Arkansas
Law Review. Additionally, the author extends thanks to God for making this Comment
possible, and to all those who vehemently disagree with each other - sharpening arguments
and propagating the sport of critical debate.
1. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
2. LEONARD L. RICHARDS, SHAYS’S REBELLION: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION’S
FINAL BATTLE 4, 6, 18 (2003).
3. Id. at 6.
4. See RAY RAPHAEL, A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: HOW
COMMON PEOPLE SHAPED THE FIGHT FOR INDEPENDENCE 5, 14-17 (Howard Zinn ed., The
New Press rev. ed. 2016). See also THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 5 (U.S.
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representation” is undoubtedly an idiomatic motif of the
Colonists’ purpose.5 This quaint but markedly gruesome
rebellion later became known as the American Revolution.6 After
both events had come and gone, the victors took measures to
ensure appropriate representation for their constituents.7
Likewise, both incidents required radical changes to their
respective structures of government. Given that Americans have
always gone to great lengths to seek adequate representation, it is
unsurprising that the national popular vote movement exists.
That being said, this Comment aims to prove why the
national popular vote—and in particular the iteration referred to
as the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact (NPVIC)—is
unconstitutional, ineffective, and potentially disastrous. While
there has been much scholarly debate about the validity of a
national popular vote interstate compact, many works have
focused only on the Compact Clause requirements. The articles
that have shifted focus away from the compact aspect of the
popular vote system either fail to incorporate the Compact Clause
materials at all or do not have the benefit of new Supreme Court
decisions outlining the States’ near plenary power to control their
electors.
This Comment aims to provide a holistic picture of the
NPVIC and any closely related compacts through updated
precedent. This Comment will first look at what a national
popular vote might entail and explicitly lays out the most
prominent popular vote movement, the NPVIC. This Comment
will then focus on the NPVIC’s Compact Clause element to
determine whether congressional approval is required before this
compact can go into effect. Next, this Comment will address the
1776) (saying one justification for the revolution was the deterioration of “the right of
Representation in the Legislature, a right inestimable to them and formidable to tyrants
only”).
5. See, e.g., RAPHAEL, supra note 4, at 16-17 (saying the American Revolution did not
spawn from mere class warfare and was in fact instigated in part by “[m]any merchants,
lawyers, and other colonists of comfortable means object[ing] only to the abuse of power by
the British Parliament”).
6. See id. at 24 (saying the lead up to the American Revolution was carried out by
small, unorganized movements, not a heroic call to arms by any founding father).
7. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. V, para. 2; see also U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 1.
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potential legal challenges to the NPVIC that would exist despite
congressional approval. In discussing that post-approval claim,
the potential procedural bars to a case against the NPVIC will be
addressed, then the substantive challenges of any potential case.8
Finally, this Comment will close on the national popular vote
movement’s purpose and some healthy alternatives to safely and
practically reach that same goal. In conclusion, this Comment
will advocate one alternative above the rest for its constitutional
consistency, compliance with social reformation demands, and
structural integrity.
I. DEFINING A NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE
In determining a national popular vote’s constitutionality, it
is necessary to first define, in a concise manner, what a national
popular vote is. Luckily, since 2006, many States have proposed
and adopted a uniform interstate compact, the NPVIC, to achieve
that very thing.9 While none of the NPVIC statutes have gone
into effect as of this Comment’s writing, their activation has been
looming year after year and will do so in perpetuity.10 This
perpetual possibility stems from the fact that, once adopted, there
is no action necessary except to wait for the triggering event—the
addition of more member States.11 As a result, States that have
already adopted the NPVIC can renew this measure without end
and with an unlimited time to garner support.12 This Comment
will focus on the NPVIC alone because it appears to have the most
wind beneath its wings, compared to other national popular vote
proposals.13 After the 2016 presidential election, the NPVIC
8. The substantive challenges will be predicated on the plain text of the Constitution,
the thoughts and opinions of the founding fathers during the convention, and the current
social and political arguments against a national popular vote and the NPVIC specifically.
9. THOMAS H. NEALE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., NPV—THE NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE
INITIATIVE: PROPOSING DIRECT ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT THROUGH AN INTERSTATE
COMPACT 2 (2019).
10. Status of National Popular Vote Bill in Each State, NAT’L POPULAR VOTE,
[https://perma.cc/MM4U-PDEQ] (last visited Jan. 28, 2021).
11. See NEALE, supra note 9, at 1.
12. See id.
13. Eric T. Tollar & Spencer H. Kimball, A More Perfect Electoral College:
Challenging Winner-Takes-All Provisions Under the Twelfth Amendment, 9 LEGIS. & POL’Y
BRIEF 4, 28 (2020).
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found renewed support, which generated the most positive
movement towards a national popular vote since the idea’s
inception.14 That being said, this Comment’s analysis and
conclusions can be extended to any similar proposal so long as no
material changes have occurred. After reviewing other proposals,
it appears the general principles of a national popular vote system
remain more or less unchanged in any iteration of the proposal.15
So, what system does the NPVIC set out? First and most
critically, it will, as the name implies, nationalize the election
processes of member States.16 In other words, it will eradicate
any distinction between State lines when determining which
candidate the State electors should vote for. Upon the first
presidential election’s occurrence after the compact goes into
effect, the NPVIC would instead instruct member States to
conduct their statewide popular votes as they would absent the
compact.17 The States would then add up each of the statewide
popular votes, and the “chief election official” of each State
would determine the nationwide popular vote’s outcome.18 At
this point, the chief election official would submit the outcome of
the national popular vote to the members of that State’s Electoral
College.19 The electors would then cast their ballots, conforming
to the national popular vote’s results, regardless of what results
their State yielded.20 The “election official” designation belongs
to either the State’s governor or the mayor in the District of
Columbia.21 Coupled with the wording of some State statutes that
bind electors to their party’s primary candidate, the NPVIC’s
process would effectively restrict the electors to vote only for the
candidate who won the nationwide popular vote.22
14. Id.
15. See, e.g., Ralph M. Goldman, Hubert Humphrey’s S. J. 152: A New Proposal for
Electoral College Reform, 2 MIDWEST J. POL. SCI. 89, 90 (1958); H.R.J. Res. 109, 108th
Cong. (2004).
16. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-15-4.1 (2019).
17. 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 20/5 (2009).
18. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-60-4002 (2019).
19. D.C. CODE § 1-1051.01 (2010).
20. D.C. CODE § 1-1051.01.
21. WASH. REV. CODE § 29A.56.300 (2009).
22. See Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 2316, 2323-24 (2020) (saying states have
absolute control of their electors); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-212 (1979) (voiding faithless
votes); CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 6906, 18002 (1994) (imposing a penalty for a faithless vote).
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The NPVIC will take effect when a sufficient number of
States join the compact.23 The number of federally delegated
electoral votes each State has determines the number of necessary
States.24 Before the compact can take effect, the total number of
electoral votes collectively possessed by member States must
equal 270 or more, so that this compact and its members alone
can secure the presidential seat.25 As of this Comment’s writing,
the NPVIC member States’ combined electoral votes equal 195,
only 75 shy of their 270 goal.26 Despite the NPVIC’s adoption
by more than a dozen States, it does not appear that this compact
has been proffered for congressional approval.27 The following
section will discuss why congressional approval is necessary, but
not sufficient, for the compact to be effective in a constitutional
manner.
II. WHY A COMPACT OF THIS NATURE WOULD
NEED CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL
The Compact Clause of the Constitution is found in Article
I, Section 10, Clause 3. The pertinent language in that mandate
is as follows: “No State shall, without the Consent of Congress
. . . enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State
. . . .”28 While this seems straightforward, the Supreme Court has
varied significantly in determining what is required by this
clause.29 The irony with this clause’s inconsistent treatment is
that both accepted definitions are allegedly based on textualist
interpretations of the Constitution.30 The broader of the two
definitions would place a bar on any interstate agreement made
without congressional consent, regardless of the nature of such
agreement.31 Under this interpretation, the Court defines the
23. HAW. REV. STAT. § 14D-1 (2008).
24. OR. REV. STAT. § 248.355 (2001).
25. See 17 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 17-4.2-1 (2013).
26. Status of National Popular Vote Bill in Each State, supra note 10.
27. NEALE, supra note 9, at 2.
28. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. 3.
29. Compare U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 468 (1978)
(defining “agreements” and “compacts” narrowly), with Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S.
503, 519 (1893) (defining “agreements” and “compacts” broadly).
30. U.S. Steel Corp., 434 U.S. at 460; Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. at 519.
31. U.S. Steel Corp., 434 U.S. at 459.
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terms “compact” and “agreement” as used in Article I, Section 10
broadly and synonymously.32 This encompasses any activity that
possibly interferes with the supremacy of the United States, and
any activity that “the United States can have no possible objection
[to] or have any interest in interfering with[.]”33
This plain text meaning of the Compact Clause, as laid out
above, was previously said to be invalid when read in context by
the proponents of the narrower definition.34 While the Court did
acknowledge that the two contrasting definitions were both
predicated on the plain text of the Constitution, the first
interpretation was nevertheless abandoned as the Court was
reluctant to bar interstate agreements that “do not enhance state
power to the detriment of federal supremacy.”35 In addition, the
Supreme Court has indicated that Congress can implicitly
approve of an interstate compact before it is fully furnished for
any formal approval.36 The Court also stressed that there are
some instances where the States must act before Congress can
determine whether its approval will be granted or not.37 In sum,
not every agreement entered into between States requires
congressional approval.38 The Court even went as far as to say
that some agreements did not need congressional approval at all
because the historical practice of seeking congressional approval
for like compacts was merely out of caution and convenience for
the associated states, rather than to prevent injury to the
supremacy of the United States.39 However, the Court did
acknowledge that any negative impact to the supremacy of the
United States was to be considered for its potential of and not
actual injury.40

32. Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. at 520.
33. Id. at 518.
34. See id. at 519.
35. U.S. Steel Corp., 434 U.S. at 460.
36. Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. at 521 (finding that congressional approval may
be implied in a number of ways including subsequent ratification and enforcement of the
terms of a compact).
37. See id. at 521.
38. See id.
39. U.S. Steel Corp., 434 U.S. at 471.
40. Id. at 472.
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While there has been some pushback over the years to this
laissez-faire rule—allowing significant interstate dealings
without congressional approval41—the most important pushback
to this rule (regarding a national popular vote) was the
acknowledgment that the interference with the supremacy of the
United States was not the only matter for consideration.42 Instead,
the Court recognized that an agreement would require
congressional approval when such approval would guard against
any potential adverse effect on any State not made a party to the
agreement.43 If there is an agreement that has the potential to
injure another State, it is the right and duty of Congress to provide
approval before the agreement goes into effect.44 The Court
eventually laid out four indicia that an agreement would be of the
kind to require congressional approval due to its potential harm
to another State. These indicators are: (1) the existence of a joint
administrative body between the States, (2) the action of one
member State being conditioned on the action of another member
State, (3) the bar on any of the States to unilaterally and freely
modify or repeal their acceptance of the agreement, and (4) the
requirement of reciprocity in an agreement concerning limitations
imposed on a member State’s inherent powers.45
The general principles of the Compact Clause include
possible interference with federal supremacy or a substantial
impact on non-member States.46 As a result, congressional
approval is required here regardless of the indicators’ existence,
but that will be discussed later.47
Assuming, arguendo, that further proof is needed to
determine whether congressional approval is required, the above
test, when applied to the compact at hand, is satisfied with three
out of the four indicators being present.48 There does not appear
41. See New Hampshire v. Maine, 426 U.S. 363, 372 (1976) (White, J., dissenting).
42. See Florida v. Georgia, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 478, 494 (1854).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Ne. Bancorp, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., 472 U.S. 159, 175
(1985).
46. U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 473 (1978); see also
Florida v. Georgia, 58 U.S. (17 How.) at 494.
47. See infra Part II.
48. See NEALE, supra note 9, at 1-2.
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to be any indication that the NPVIC will adopt an administrative
body; thus, the first indicator is likely not met.49 However, the
rest of the indicators are blatantly present. Getting the ball rolling,
the NPVIC meets the second indicator, which essentially looks to
“whether [the compact’s] effectiveness depends on the conduct of
other members . . . .”50 This is met because the NPVIC will come
into effect only after “states cumulatively possessing a majority
of the electoral votes” have enacted this agreement.51 This means
that every member State has only conditionally approved the
compact, subject to action by other States.
Additionally, how a State directs the panel of electors to cast
their electoral votes would be predicated on conducting a popular
vote in each of the other member States.52 Northeast Bancorp,
Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
(Bancorp) involved multiple States drafting a similar statute in
each jurisdiction, and there was evidence suggesting that the State
legislatures drafted the statutes together.53 Nevertheless, the
Bancorp Court found that no compact had been formed, let alone
one that needed congressional approval.54 This was largely
because while an incentive structure was designed to entice more
States to adopt the similarly-worded statute, the document was
more akin to a model law than an agreement between States.55
In addition, the incentive structure found in that case was not
a result of the proposed law itself, but rather the incentive
originated from a federal law barring the interstate exchange of
bank titles, absent a contrary State law permitting the transfer.56
In essence, the law there was not reciprocal because the States
49. But see JOHN R. KOZA ET AL., EVERY VOTE EQUAL: A STATE BASED PLAN FOR
ELECTING THE PRESIDENT BY NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE 278 (National Popular Vote Press,
4th ed. 2013) (“These tasks could be simplified by the establishment of an administrative
clearinghouse for these functions. The officials of the compacting states might themselves
establish such a clearinghouse. Alternatively, such a clearinghouse might be established by
federal law.”).
50. Gillette Co. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 363 P.3d 94, 101 (Cal. 2015); see also COLO.
REV. STAT. § 24-60-4002 (2019).
51. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 4303A (2019); see also NEALE, supra note 9, at 1.
52. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-60-4002; S.P. 252, 129th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Me. 2019).
53. See 472 U.S. 159, 163-65, 173, 175 (1985).
54. Id. at 175.
55. See id. at 169.
56. Id.
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were merely working together to reap the full benefits of an
enacted federal law.57 In that case, once one State adopted the
statute it became valid and enforceable as to that State,
independent from the actions of any other State.58 In short, the
statute at issue in Bancorp is vastly different from the NPVIC.59
To reiterate, the NPVIC requires other States to adopt the
same law before it becomes effective.60 While there is no
mandated adoption or forced incentive structure built into the
NPVIC,61 there are other ramifications States may face if they do
not play nice with the existing member States upon activation.62
The States’ selection of electors is expressly conditioned on a
popular vote in the other member States.63 In conclusion, the
NPVIC’s conditional adoption clause and how the compact
functions make its effectiveness conditioned on other member
States’ actions.
Next, when a compact cannot freely and unilaterally be
repealed, that indicates the compact will likely need prior
congressional approval.64 Customarily, a compact has the
“distinguishing feature” of presumptively being interminable
without the deliberate action of multiple member States and thus
requires congressional approval.65 The presumption of this
norm’s presence in compacts can only be overborne by “express
provisions that permit withdrawal . . . .”66 In fact, express
permission to leave a compact is so necessary that “[t]he absence
of comparable language in the Compact is significant and weighs
against” the ability of a State to freely and unilaterally repeal a
compact.67 One State supreme court went as far as saying that not
57. Id. at 164.
58. Ne. Bancorp, Inc., 472 U.S. at 175.
59. Compare MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 167A, § 2 (1996), with OR. REV. STAT. § 23.248
(2019).
60. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 1-1051.01 (2010).
61. See WASH. REV. CODE § 29A.56.300 (2009).
62. See generally ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-A, § 9882 (2003).
63. HAW. REV. STAT. § 14D-1 (2008).
64. See Ne. Bancorp, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., 472 U.S. 159,
175 (1985).
65. Waterfront Comm’n v. Murphy, 429 F. Supp. 3d 1, 11 (D.N.J. 2019), vacated, 961
F.3d 234, 242 (3d Cir. 2020) (vacating order for lack of jurisdiction).
66. Id. at 11.
67. Id. (citing Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. v. Herrmann, 569 U.S. 614, 633-34 (2013)).
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even the unequivocal ability to come and go as a State freely
pleases (even when enumerated) is sufficiently dispositive of
whether a compact would require congressional approval under
this indicator.68 Instead, the court there looked to the statute’s
history.69
While the member States are free to repeal the NPVIC, they
have a limited duration to repeal the statute.70 Otherwise, they
will be bound by their initial pledge to appoint their electors based
on the nationwide popular vote.71 If they intend their refutation
to be effective, the member States must repeal the NPVIC before
the last six months of a president’s term.72 This, while not an
absolute bar on the repeal of the agreement, sufficiently impacts
a State’s unilateral ability to withdraw.73 There is no language
indicating that States can freely repeal or modify the statute at
their discretion.74 Because the absence of express permission to
freely and unilaterally repeal or modify a compact indicates the
inability to do so,75 the NPVIC would presumptively not allow
member States to leave or modify willingly. In addition to the
absence of such a provision, the express restriction on when a
member State can effectively walk away76 sufficiently satisfies
this indicator.
Finally, and “[m]ost importantly,” when a compact requires
reciprocal obligations or limits to inherent State powers, the
compact will need congressional approval.77 This indicator
essentially looks to whether the member State “ceded a portion of
its own sovereignty in order to benefit from the collective action
of multiple states . . . .”78 All member States to the NPVIC give
up their ability to direct their electors to vote under that State’s
68.
69.
action”).
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
(1985).
78.

Gillette Co. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 363 P.3d 94, 101 (Cal. 2015).
Id. (finding “the history of the Compact is replete with examples of unilateral state
COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-60-4002 (2019).
D.C. CODE § 1-1051.01 (2010).
HAW. REV. STAT. § 14D-1 (2008).
HAW. REV. STAT. § 14D-1.
See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 1-1051.01.
See Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. v. Herrmann, 569 U.S. 614, 633-34 (2013).
HAW. REV. STAT. § 14D-1.
Ne. Bancorp, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., 472 U.S. 159, 175
Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Comm’r of Revenue, 880 N.W.2d 844, 849 (Minn. 2016).
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mandates.79 This ability is undoubtedly a part of a State’s
sovereign power.80 The restriction of such sovereign power so
that all member States may expand their combined strength is
precisely the kind of reciprocal obligation this indicator
requires.81 In sum, the most important indicator that a compact is
of the kind that would require congressional approval also
appears to be the most straightforward. It is undeniable that any
State that enters into the NPVIC limits its ability to “appoint, in
such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of
Electors . . . .”82 This is because member States will be relying
on the chief election officials of other member States and the
outcome of the national popular vote to allocate electoral votes—
rather than the independent discretion of their respective
legislatures.83
Admittedly, the Bancorp case has largely been cited for its
commerce precedent and is rarely used to adjudicate challenges
to the Compact Clause.84 That being said, a return to the general
Compact Clause principles will necessitate congressional
approval, regardless of the indicators’ presence. This is because
the NPVIC compact is, on its face and by its text, a political matter
undoubtedly capable of affecting the rights and power of other
States as well as the federal government.85 The compact states
“[t]his article shall govern . . . in each member state,”86 “to
produce a national popular vote . . . [unless] the electoral college
is abolished.”87 Additionally, the supporters of the NPVIC even
79. See, e.g., 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 20/5 (2009); see also Chiafalo v. Washington, 140
S. Ct. 2316, 2323-24 (2020) (indicating each State has a right to independently control its
electors).
80. See Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 2323-24; U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 1, cl. 2.
81. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 880 N.W.2d at 849.
82. U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 1, cl. 2.
83. HAW. REV. STAT. § 14D-1 (2008).
84. See, e.g., Indep. Cmty. Bankers Ass’n v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Rsrv. Sys., 838
F.2d 969, 973 (8th Cir. 1988); Cont’l Ill. Corp. v. Lewis, 827 F.2d 1517, 1521 n.5 (11th Cir.
1987); Smith Setzer & Sons v. S.C. Procurement Rev. Panel, 20 F.3d 1311, 1322 (4th Cir.
1994); Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. South Carolina, 945 F.2d 781, 792, 793 n.16
(4th Cir. 1991).
85. See JAMES MADISON, DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 201
(Gaillard Hunt & James Brown Scott eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1920) [hereinafter MADISON,
CONVENTION NOTES] (discussing the ramifications of various electoral schemes).
86. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2753 (2011).
87. Act of June 12, 2019, ch. 356, 2019 Or. Laws (internal quotation marks omitted).
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admit, potentially obliviously so, that the compact would
guarantee the presidency to the member States, that the compact’s
design is to “remedy” the laws in 48 States, and that the NPVIC
intends to reshape how federal elections are campaigned for.88
Now turning a closer eye to these broad principles, it seems
the NPVIC’s potential impact could have a disastrous toll on the
supremacy of the United States, as well as the sovereignty of other
States. Regarding the impact on supremacy:
the compact may not authorize member states to do anything
collectively that they could not do individually. Second,
member states must not delegate their sovereignty, but rather
they must retain their freedom to withdraw from the compact
at any time.89

Suppose member States engage in these practices—
collective power enhancement, delegation of sovereignty, and
conceding the ability to withdrawal—through a compact. In that
case, that compact is said to be a potential threat to the supremacy
of the United States and to non-member States, and that compact
would require prior congressional approval.90 These concerns are
very similar to the four indicators previously stated, and thus this
analysis will be brief. The NPVIC combines the member States’
power to secure for its members the sole ability to determine the
presidency.91 Alone, no State could achieve this outcome. Again,
the States are not free to withdraw without significant restrictions,
and their withdrawal will potentially be deemed invalid—replete
with eerily looming enforcement mechanisms left for
speculation.92 Finally, the sovereign powers of the member States
have been partially subjugated to the NPVIC, exactly as

88. Agreement Among the States to Elect the President by National Popular Vote,
NAT’L POPULAR VOTE, [https://perma.cc/HSN2-QCV3] (last visited Jan. 26, 2021).
89. State v. Kurt, 802 S.W.2d 954, 955 (Mo. 1991) (citing U.S. Steel Corp. v.
Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 473 (1978)).
90. See Florida v. Georgia, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 478, 494 (1854); Virginia v. Tennessee,
148 U.S. 503, 520 (1893).
91. 17 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 17-4.2-1 (2013).
92. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-60-4002 (2019); see also supra notes 65-77 and
accompanying text (discussing how the member States to the NPVIC are not free to withdraw
from the compact).
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contemplated by the broad compact concerns when determining
the necessity of congressional approval.93
Having determined that the NPVIC is an interstate compact
of the kind that requires congressional approval (with or without
the presence of the four indicia), the question that remains is what
recourse a non-member State or the citizen of a member State
could have if Congress did approve the NPVIC.
III. WHY A COMPACT OF THIS NATURE WOULD
STILL FAIL TO BE CONSTITUTIONAL, DESPITE
CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL
There are a couple of different issues that must be discussed
before approaching the merits of any potential case against the
NPVIC. Both of these issues are theoretically dispositive of the
case on procedural grounds. To get to the case’s merits, the
justiciability doctrine and jurisdiction must be satisfied.94 Briefly
addressing each concern now, there are no justiciability grounds
that would dismiss this cause of action because it would be based
on a non-political question, and most likely, non-member States
would be filing this suit against the federal government
(dismissing standing concerns).95 Even if this were a suit against
one State by another, it is likely to be valid.96 Additionally, the
Supreme Court may or may not have original jurisdiction to hear
the complaint, but it could nevertheless reach the Supreme Court
through appeals.97

93. See Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 2316, 2323-24 (2020) (saying States have
near plenary power to dictate electors).
94. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198-99, 204 (1962).
95. See id. at 209; see also infra Section III.A.
96. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 405-06 (1821) (“[The Eleventh
Amendment] does not comprehend controversies between two or more States, or between a
State and a foreign State. The jurisdiction of the Court still extends to these cases and in
these a State may still be sued.”); see also Alabama v. Arizona, 291 U.S. 286, 291-92 (1934);
see also infra Section III.A.
97. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2; 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) (1988); 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1)(2) (1988); Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 393, 399 (“If a State be a party, the jurisdiction of
this Court is original . . . . The original jurisdiction of this Court cannot be enlarged, but its
appellate jurisdiction may be exercised in every case cognizable under the third article of the
constitution . . . .”).
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Within the merits of the case, the Constitution plainly allots
the power of elections to the individual States.98 However,
questions remain regarding the exclusivity of such power.99
Looking to the Supreme Court’s precedent, the States’ power
appears to be definitively exclusive, at the cost of federal and
State interference.100 This conclusion is further aided by the
founding era’s thoughts and examples.101 Finally, if no legal
argument is persuasive, the social and political reasons alone
should be sufficient to halt the NPVIC.
A. Justiciability Concerns
Why does a judge swear to discharge his duties agreeably to
the constitution of the United States, if that constitution forms no
rule for his government?102
It is a fundamental principle that the legislature’s mere will
cannot alter the Constitution absent amendment proceedings.103
Likewise, the legislative branch cannot pass any laws or take any
action repugnant to the Constitution.104 Suppose the legislature
engages in any activity that is thought to be unconstitutional. In
that case, it is the Supreme Court’s prerogative to adjudicate
whether or not there has been legitimate infringement.105 While
these principles are no doubt ingrained in the hearts of every
scholar of the law, these principles become increasingly murky
when dealing with an interstate compact. Of course, the usual
justiciability concerns are present with an interstate compact, just
as with any potential case and controversy brought before the

98. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
99. See, e.g., Chiafalo v. Washington 140 S. Ct. 2316, 2318 (2020); Ray v. Blair, 343
U.S. 214, 225 (1952); McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 35 (1892) (“The question before
us is not one of policy but of power . . . .”); see also infra Section III.B.1.
100. See Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 2323-24; see also Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit
Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 551 (1985); see also infra Section III.B.1.
101. See MADISON, CONVENTION NOTES, supra note 85, at 57, 509; see also infra
Section III.B.2.
102. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803).
103. Id. at 177.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 177-78.
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Court.106 However, the Compact Clause’s mandates erect some
peculiar obstacles to justiciability that need to be addressed.
The first of these, and most likely to prevent a suit, is the
political question doctrine. The decision to approve or disprove
an interstate compact is undoubtedly one of the legislature’s
political judgment, rather than one of constitutional judgment
akin to that of the Supreme Court’s.107 The political question
doctrine then would seemingly bar the Supreme Court’s review
of a claim alleging Congress improperly approved an interstate
compact in violation of a constitutional principle.108 This doctrine
requires federal courts to determine whether, based on six
independent factors, a matter is committed to another branch such
that separation of powers precludes judicial review.109 These
factors are: (1) constitutional commitment of the issue to a
different political branch, (2) the lack of judicially discoverable
and manageable standards, (3) the need for an initial non-judicial
policy decision, (4) the potential for any judicial decision to
indicate a lack of respect to the coordinate branch, (5) the need to
adhere to a political decision already made, or (6) the potential for
embarrassment after multiple branches have resolved the issue
differently.110
This bar is especially present when the claim is based on a
violation of the Guarantee Clause, which the Court has explicitly
labeled a political question.111 The Guarantee Clause requires
every State of the Union to be guaranteed a republican form of
government.112 In other words, some fashion of a representative

106. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 199 (1962) (applying the justiciability standards
to that case because it arose under the Federal Constitution); see also Virginia v. Tennessee,
148 U.S. 503, 517 (1893) (Compact Clause cases arise under the Federal Constitution).
107. U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 485 (1978) (White, J.,
dissenting).
108. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
109. Id. at 211, 217.
110. Id. at 217.
111. Id. at 224 (“[C]hallenges to congressional action on the ground of inconsistency
with [the Guarantee Clause] present no justiciable question.”). There is, however, some
debate as to whether this bar still exists with the same force. See Deborah Jones Merritt, The
Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV.
1, 71-72 (1988) (citing circuit court decisions as well as Supreme Court decisions that
indicate the Guarantee Clause may still be used to adjudicate cases).
112. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
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government must be present across the nation.113 Here, it is
abundantly clear that any claim against establishing a national
popular vote would incorporate that very clause;114 however, that
may not be the only alleged constitutional violation possible. If a
claim touches on the Guarantee Clause but also relies on the
violation of another constitutional principle, the claim may still
be heard assuming the alternative violation does not likewise fall
under the Court’s political question bar.115
Thus, it is necessary to determine what other constitutional
principles might be violated by congressional approval if any suit
is maintained against an interstate compact establishing a national
popular vote. Although still potentially problematic, the
requirement of a system of electors, also known as the
Presidential Electors Clause, found in Article II, Section 1 and the
Twelfth Amendment, would undoubtedly be violated with the
establishment of a national popular vote.116
Additionally, the Supreme Court has held (although stepped
back in more recent cases)117 that the Constitution provides
citizens an affirmative right to vote.118 While not considered a
natural, unalienable right, it is still considered fundamental.119
Because of the fundamental nature of the right to vote,120 the
NPVIC could be subject to attack for equal protection and due
process violations.121 This would likely stem from individuals
who felt they were now disenfranchised from their vote due to
their State’s sparse population. As the Supreme Court has said,

113. See THOMAS COOLEY, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 194 (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 1880) (defining
republican government as “a government by representatives chosen by the people”).
114. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 141 (2000) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
115. Baker, 369 U.S. at 227.
116. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2; U.S. CONST. amend. XII. The cause of such a
violation will be discussed in more detail in Section III.B.
117. E.g., Bush, 531 U.S. at 104 (“The individual citizen has no federal constitutional
right to vote for electors for the President of the United States . . . .”).
118. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. See Bush, 531 U.S. at 104, 110.
THE
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“[a] citizen, a qualified voter, is no more nor no less so because
he lives in the city or on the farm.”122
While it is important to note these additional means in which
the NPVIC might be attacked, this Comment will only focus on
the most ambiguous and challenging means of invalidating the
NPVIC: the idea that the compact is a violation of the Presidential
Electors Clause, which establishes the Electoral College.123 This
is partly because this Comment aims to avoid discussing
individual rights and instead discusses the right of States as
sovereign entities (which presumptively have no right to sue for
due process/equal protection violations124).
The distinction between reliance on the Guarantee Clause for
a potential suit versus the Presidential Electors Clause is
admittedly sparse. Still, the distinction is nevertheless present in
that the Guarantee Clause helps define a judicially enforceable
requirement in the Constitution. The use of the Guarantee Clause
to define the meaning of the electoral requirement is different
from the Supreme Court’s potential to “disrupt a State’s
republican regime” by enforcing a government system the Court
deems more akin to a republic, which would violate the political
question doctrine.125 The Guarantee Clause will only be used
here as a means of textual interpretation and not to determine what
that clause alone requires of the States.
A suit against the NPVIC, predicated on the violation of the
Presidential Electors clause, is not a political question. This is
because the suit, although first requiring Congress to exercise its
constitutionally committed judgment,126 would be against a
potential violation of the Constitution.127 This case would only

122. Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667 (1966) (quoting Reynolds
v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964)).
123. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
124. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 323 (1966). But see Shelby
Cnty. v. Alabama, 570 U.S. 529, 544 (2013).
125. Bush, 531 U.S. at 141 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217
(1962).
126. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
127. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2; see also McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 23
(1892). The State of Michigan was sued for improperly appointing electoral members in
violation of the Constitution. McPherson, 146 U.S. at 23. The Court found that it had
jurisdiction to hear the case saying:
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be brought after Congress gave its consent to the interstate
compact, and “once Congress gives its consent, a compact
between States—like any other federal statute—becomes the law
of the land.”128
When the question presented to the Court is whether
congressional activity has violated the Constitution, the Supreme
Court can hear the case regardless of potential political
concerns.129 The political question doctrine is not designed to
prevent the Court from hearing legitimate constitutional
questions.130 Instead, the political question doctrine, under the
guise that the Court does not have that power under the
Constitution, is designed to bar the Court from hearing truly
political matters and, in so doing, questioning coordinate
branches’ judgments or rationales.131 This is the difference
between asking whether a coordinate branch can do something
versus whether it should do something. The former can be heard
by the Court, whereas the latter is barred.132
The validity of Congress approving the NPVIC falls under
that first category. Regardless of the NPVIC’s potential merits, a
suit against congressional approval would simply be asking
whether such approval was an appropriate use of Congress’s
constitutional powers. In this respect, no deference is deserved,
nor any embarrassment incurred by asking whether the
Constitution was violated.133
it is said that all questions connected with the election of a presidential elector
are political in their nature; that the court has no power finally to dispose of
them; and that its decision would be subject to review by political officers and
agencies, as the state board of canvassers, the legislature in joint convention,
and the governor, or, finally, the Congress. But the judicial power of the
United States extends to all cases in law or equity arising under the
Constitution and laws of the United States, and this is a case so arising . . . .
Id.
128. Texas v. New Mexico, 138 S. Ct. 954, 958 (2018).
129. McPherson, 146 U.S. at 23; Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 28 (1968).
130. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 210-11, 217.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 217 (“The courts cannot reject as ‘no law suit’ a bona fide controversy as to
whether some action . . . exceeds constitutional authority.”).
133. See id. at 218; Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821) (“It is most
true that this Court will not take jurisdiction if it should not. [B]ut it is equally true, that it
must take jurisdiction if it should. The judiciary cannot, as the legislature may, avoid a
measure because it approaches the confines of the constitution. We cannot pass it by because
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Assuming for a moment that the violation of the mandate for
the Electoral College is sufficient to state a claim, it must be
agreed that the case would meet the other justiciability
requirements exclusively on that alleged violation for the suit to
commence absent subsequent equal protection or due process
claims.
Given that any potential case brought to the Supreme Court
after enacting the NPVIC likely cannot be directly contingent on
the Guarantee Clause,134 the remaining causes of action must
provide a sufficiently justiciable case regarding standing. As
discussed above, this Comment will only consider the
Presidential Electors Clause.
The recent case brought by the Attorney General in Texas
regarding the 2020 election may initially seem dispositive of this
question; however, the two causes of action are irreconcilably
different.135 Standing generally requires injury, causation, and
redressability.136 Causation is essentially a given when “the
plaintiff is himself an object of the action (or forgone action) at
issue.”137 However, States have special standing, or relaxed
standing, to bring suits to enforce their sovereign rights.138 This
level of standing alleviates the need to show injury.139 More
recent cases of State suits against the federal government fail to
even contemplate State standing and tacitly accept the State’s
standing to sue.140 Thus, the difference between a suit against the
it is doubtful. With whatever doubts, with whatever difficulties, a case may be attended, we
must decide it if it be brought before us. We have no more right to decline the exercise of
jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would
be treason to the constitution.”).
134. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 227.
135. Texas v. Pennsylvania, 141 S. Ct. 1230 (2020).
136. See, e.g., Baker, 369 U.S. at 204.
137. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992).
138. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920) (allowing Missouri to bring
suit against the United States for entering into a treaty in violation of Missouri’s perceived
regulatory rights, but ultimately rejecting the claim because no regulatory rights existed
there).
139. See Colorado v. Toll, 268 U.S. 228, 230 (1925) (allowing a State suit against the
federal government for violating the State’s sovereign rights); Tarah Leigh Grove, When Can
a State Sue the United States?, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 851, 862 n.54 (2016) (discussing a
State’s special sovereignty).
140. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156 (1992) (immediately
discussing the substantive rights of a State without first discussing any potential justiciability
bars); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 205 (1987).
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NPVIC and the suit launched by Texas, and what in turn makes
the presented hypothetical suit sustainable, is that it is predicated
on federal or state infringement of a State right, satisfying
standing.141
However, it is possible that a suit against the NPVIC could
also be launched (either by a member State or a non-member
State) against a member State or multiple member States. If this
were to be the case, it would initially seem that the standing
concerns are the same as a suit against the federal government.142
Despite those initial impressions, the Court has on occasion
restricted the capacity of one State to sue another, requiring
“absolute necessity” to exercise jurisdiction.143 They have gone
as far as to require “serious magnitude and imminent” injury be
“clearly shown . . . .”144 There is undoubtedly a more significant
burden on a State to establish standing than that of a private
individual in a suit against another State. However, this increased
burden appears to be inconsequential given the gravity of the
topic.
It is important to note that another underlying tenant of the
justiciability doctrine is that the Court must have jurisdiction in
the first place to hear the matter.145 The Constitution provides
original jurisdiction to the Supreme Court in cases where a State
would be made a party as well as those in which the United States
is a named party.146 Congress cannot reduce this original
jurisdiction.147 That being said, the Court has been reluctant to
exercise its original jurisdiction in specific cases.148 If the Court’s
141. See Grove, supra note 139, at 862 n.54. This distinction may apply less fervently
in the case of a member State given that it sought this legislation voluntarily and thus is not
afforded the same protection of the rights it ceded. See also Garcia v. San Antonio Metro.
Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 551 (1985); Merritt, supra note 111, at 17-18.
142. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 378 (1821) (“If [two or more
States] be the parties, it is entirely unimportant what may be the subject of controversy. Be
it what it may, these parties have a constitutional right to come into the Courts of the
Union.”); Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 731 (1838).
143. Alabama v. Arizona, 291 U.S. 286, 291 (1934).
144. Id. at 292.
145. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 199-200 (1962).
146. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2; Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 147
(1803).
147. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 138.
148. Arizona v. New Mexico, 425 U.S. 794, 797 (1976) (“[T]he pending state-court
action provides an appropriate forum in which the issues tendered here may be litigated.”).
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exercise of jurisdiction remains consistent, a post-congressionalapproval case against the NPVIC likely will not be heard under
original jurisdiction. Regardless though, this hypothetical case
could still be heard at the federal level. It just may have to reach
the Supreme Court as a course of appeals.149
While there is some question as to whether a State could sue
a member State, alleging that the NPVIC violates the complaining
State’s rights, it is undoubtedly clear that there would be no
question as to the possibility of a suit between a State and the
United States.
Having sufficiently determined that the
justiciability concerns would not preclude review of an interstate
compact after congressional approval, when a suit is based on a
violation of the Presidential Electors Clause, the merits of the case
remain.
B. Substantive Concerns
Assuming that the Supreme Court has not yet dismissed the
case for want of procedural requirements, the case’s merits must
sufficiently justify a ruling against the NPVIC. The merits of the
case will be discussed below by first looking into the plain text of
the Constitution as well as the Court’s interpretation of the same.
Then this Comment will discuss both the founding era arguments
against the NPVIC and the modern-day social and political
arguments against the NPVIC.
1. Plain Text of the Constitution and Judicial Interpretation
The Constitution merely orders that each State must appoint
electors equal to its number of representatives in Congress as
directed by its State legislature.150 These electors must meet in
their respective States and vote via ballot for the President and
Vice President separately.151 Nowhere in the Constitution are
electors of a State directed to vote based on specific criteria.152
Despite the Founders’ suggestion that the only criterion was to be
149.
150.
151.
152.

28 U.S.C. §§ 1254, 1257(a) (1988).
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 2316, 2326 (2020).
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the electors’ independent decision, and no vote was to be cast at
the direction of any law,153 this is simply not present on the face
of the Constitution.154 As a result of the lack of instruction in this
matter, the requirement of an electoral body must first be defined
by examining the totality of the document. If ambiguity persists,
the practices at the time of ratification should prevail.155
Taking the entire Constitution into account, the States were
intended to remain as several unionized sovereigns instead of
forming a single sovereign entity.156 In addition, the Constitution
promises to these several States a “Republican Form of
Government[.]”157
This edict for a republican form of
government modifies the establishment of an electorate system.
However, there is no authoritative mandate in the text of the
Constitution regarding federal interference with the States’
exclusive ability to generate presidential electors pursuant to their
independent form of a republican government. Therefore, a case
predicated on such interference must rely on the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of what little is enumerated.
The Court has not always favored federalism. It has often
received the tail end of the Court’s generosity, if any attention at
all.158 This inattention was somewhat alleviated when the Court
decided National League of Cities v. Usery.159 In that case, the
Supreme Court determined that there are, in fact, limitations to
the federal government’s power to regulate commerce.160 These
153. Id.; THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, at 351 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Cary &
James McClellan eds., 2001).
154. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
155. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 579-92 (2008) (applying
a textualist/originalist approach in interpreting the Constitution).
156. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1. See also THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 196-97
(James Madison) (George W. Cary & James McClellan eds., 2001); Rhode Island v.
Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 720 (1838) (recognizing the States are “sovereign
within their respective boundaries”); New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 342 (1931)
(describing the States as “neighbors members of a single” or “quasi-sovereignties bound
together in the Union”); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996) (saying the
Eleventh Amendment exists to “confirm[]” the presumption that “each State is a sovereign
entity in our federal system”).
157. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
158. See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 36 (1937) (saying
the federal power to regulate commerce is plenary in nature).
159. 426 U.S. 833, 845 (1976).
160. Id. at 842.
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limitations are predicated on the belief that the several States
retain some sovereignty.161 The Court determined that the federal
government could not legislatively displace areas deemed to be
the traditional government functions of the States—such as the
wages set for government employees—even when the power
invoked by Congress was outlined in the Constitution.162 It said
this bar was found implicitly in the Tenth Amendment.163
While it would be refreshing to reinvigorate the Tenth
Amendment in this way, the text of that Amendment simply does
not contain any language to support this protection.164
Additionally, the Court later found that the National League of
Cities rule, barring the infringement on “traditional governmental
function[s],” was unworkable and did not protect the sovereignty
of States.165 As a result of these two blunders, that case was
summarily overturned.166
The case that replaced National League of Cities provided
an equally ambiguous test to determine whether a particular State
right existed and, if so, whether the federal government could
regulate in that area or if State sovereignty barred its control.167
That case was Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority, which also dealt with the Fair Labor Standards Act’s
(FLSA) minimum wage requirements concerning government
employees.168
The Court there found that the Constitution provides both
limits and avenues to impose federal control.169 In so doing, the
Court rejected alternative theories that had previously protected
the States’ rights, such as protection from federal infringement
upon “‘uniquely’ governmental functions” or “‘necessary’
governmental services . . . .”170 Instead, the Court provided that
the Constitution’s structure protects the States from federal
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id.
See id.
Id. at 842-43.
U.S. CONST. amend. X; see also Merritt, supra note 111, at 12.
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 531 (1985).
Id.
See id. at 556; see also Merritt, supra note 111, at 15.
469 U.S. at 530.
Id. at 547.
Id. at 545.
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infringement on their sovereignty.171 It went on to say
enumerated barriers in the Constitution must justify any restraint
on federal power.172 These barriers can be a double-edged sword
cutting both for and against the sovereignty of the States.173 The
Court pointed out that the Constitution provides explicit areas that
Congress may regulate in Article 1, Sections 8 and 10.174 Paired
with the Supremacy Clause, the Court held that the States’
sovereignty was diminished upon ratification, but it is not gone.175
Since Garcia, additional precedent has shed light on the
notion of State power to control elections. In Shelby County v.
Holder, the Court not only upheld the premise of Garcia’s
federalism construction, but also explicitly acknowledged Tenth
Amendment protections for state-controlled elections.176
Specifically, it said “the Framers of the Constitution intended the
States to keep for themselves, as provided in the Tenth
Amendment, the power to regulate elections.”177 The Court also
assured that the several States retained equal sovereignty.178
The rule presently regarding federalism is that the federal
government may only regulate where it has been granted that
express authority.179 It is also important to reiterate that the States
are, in fact, independent sovereigns, although they have
surrendered some power by their status as members of the
Union.180 Much like a surgeon, the federal government may only
operate in the areas in which it has previously been given
informed consent.181

171. Id. at 552.
172. See id. at 554.
173. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 548.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. 570 U.S. 529, 543 (2013). This differs from Nat’l League of Cities in that the
Holder Court relied on enumerated State safeguards.
177. Id. (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 461-62 (1991)).
178. Id. at 544.
179. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 549; Holder, 570 U.S. at 543.
180. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 549; Holder, 570 U.S. at 543.
181. Jon F. Merz & Baruch Fischhoff, Informed Consent Does Not Mean Rational
Consent: Cognitive Limitations on Decision-Making, 11 J. LEGAL MED. 321, 322 (1990)
(“[T]he law has placed upon physicians a duty to disclose information regarding diagnosis
and treatment . . . .”); Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 2316, 2333 (2020) (quoting U.S.
Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 846 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The
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Indeed, the Garcia Court quoted James Madison
affirmatively when he said, “[i]f the power was not given,
Congress could not exercise it . . . .”182 The Court reasoned this
constitutional protection is granted to the States as evidenced in
part by the voting rights that the States retained, namely, the
ability to elect the federal executive and legislative branches.183
Indeed, the Court went on to say that, at least regarding the
Commerce Clause, substantive restraints on federal power should
be “tailored to compensate for possible failings in the national
political process . . . .”184 This has been interpreted broadly to
apply to all potential federal interference with State
sovereignty.185
Additionally, the Tenth Amendment’s
protections for enumerated States’ rights has recently been
enforced.186
National League of Cities and Garcia provide an alternative
mode of transportation for the Court to discuss federalism (an
attempt at a pun). Still, they are nonetheless demonstrative of the
federal government’s ability to regulate the Electoral College.187
Under this analytical regime, any interstate compact that creates
a popular vote, as the NPVIC does, is an impermissible
infringement on the States’ sovereignty after being adopted by
Congress.
As pointed out by the Supreme Court in Garcia, the way the
United States’ government is arranged explicitly recognizes the
States’ rights as sovereigns.188 Phrased another way, the States’
ultimate source of the Constitution’s authority is the consent of the people of each individual
State.”)).
182. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 549.
183. Id. at 550-51.
184. Id. at 554.
185. Merritt, supra note 111, at 15; see also South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S.
301, 326 (1966) (citing M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819))
(establishing the “basic test to be applied” to determine the veracity of federal interference
with State sovereignty). The Court in Katzenbach applied this test to an alleged violation of
State sovereignty authorized by the Fifteenth Amendment despite the fact that the test
originated from a potential federal violation predicated by the Commerce Clause. The use
of this test shows the interchangeability of tests designed to determine federal overreaching
despite the genesis of the federal government’s actions.
186. See Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 543, 556-57 (2013); Chiafalo, 140
S. Ct. at 2322-23, 2333.
187. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 557.
188. Id. at 549, 554.
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sovereignty is found in the Constitution by the plain text of the
Constitution (specifically that text which defines the structure of
government).189 Here, the cause of action being raised is
predicated on the same State sovereignty evidenced by
constitutional decree.190 It could be argued that the Presidential
Electors Clause is an explicit acknowledgment of State
sovereignty in that area.191 Indeed, that was argued in Bush v.
Palm Beach County Canvassing Board when the Court, per
curiam, said:
[I]n the case of a law enacted by a state legislature applicable
not only to elections to state offices, but also to the selection
of Presidential electors, the legislature is not acting solely
under the authority given it by the people of the State, but by
virtue of a direct grant of authority made under [the
Presidential Electors Clause].192

However, assuming that the Presidential Electors Clause
alone is insufficient to show that control of the Electoral College
is the exclusive right of the State, the Garcia Court went on to
recognize that a crucial element of State sovereignty, implied by
the way the Constitution created the governmental system, is the
ability of the States to solely elect the president and congress.193
Thus, the Constitution ordains the right to elect the President as a
sovereign power of all the States.194
Additional evidence that the right to oversee the vote for
President and the right to form the Electoral College is
exclusively the right of the States can be found in Chiafalo v.
Washington.195 In that case, three electors from the State of
189. See id. at 554.
190. See U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 1, cl. 2.
191. Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 2324 (“Article II, § 1’s appointments power gives the
States far-reaching authority over presidential electors, absent some other constitutional
constraint.”).
192. 531 U.S. 70, 76 (2000).
193. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 551 (“The Framers thus gave the States a role in the selection
both of the Executive and the Legislative Branches of the Federal Government.”).
194. Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 2324 (“[N]othing in the Constitution expressly prohibits
States from [controlling] presidential electors’ voting discretion . . . .”).
195. Id. at 2319-20. For an even more recent acknowledgement of such State
exclusivity, one need not look any further than the shambling mound of cases dismissed in
favor of States’ rights during and after the 2020 presidential election. See Joshua A. Douglas,
Undue Deference to States in the 2020 Election Litigation, 30 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
(forthcoming).
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Washington voted against the candidate that won the statewide
popular vote.196 The Court upheld Washington’s use of a civil
sanction against these “faithless elector[s],” saying that, “[t]he
Constitution’s text and the Nation’s history both support allowing
a State to enforce . . . far-reaching authority over presidential
electors . . . ‘conveying the broadest power of determination’ over
. . . the power to appoint an elector (in any manner) includ[ing]
power to condition his appointment[.]”197
Because the right of States to vote for President and control
the Electoral College (the States’ election rights) are exclusive,
they cannot be infringed by federal regulation,198 much like any
other exclusive State power cannot be (the power to regulate the
health and welfare of a State’s citizenry for example).199 While
the Court has sometimes allowed federal infringement of States’
rights when there exists a legitimate end for the interference,
those instances are predicated on infringement of an implicit right
of the States after the federal government was granted express
permission to regulate there by the Constitution or subsequent
amendments.200 This case is the opposite of those. The
Constitution explicitly authorizes States to appoint presidential
electors as the legislature of that State sees fit.201
At best, there is only implicit power for the federal
government to regulate the States’ election rights. This implicit
power could arguably spawn from the Civil War and other voting
rights amendments’ broad grants of regulatory authority,
especially regarding elections.202 However, this extension of
authority is not infinite. Notably, this power extends only to the
enforcement of those amendments.203 No doubt some proponents
196. Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 2322.
197. Id. at 2322, 2323-24.
198. Id.; Garcia, 469 U.S. at 551.
199. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995) (limiting congressional
regulation to only those constitutionally expressed areas and barring regulation that would
infringe on a State’s law-making power for the health of its citizens).
200. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 326 (1966) (citing to United States
v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960)). See also M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,
406 (1819) (discussing the inability of the State to tax instruments of the federal
government).
201. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
202. U.S. CONST. amends. XIV, XIX, XXIV, XXVI.
203. Id.
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of the NPVIC claim a violation of those amendments is occurring
under the existing electoral systems.204 However, it is hard to
fathom that such a systemic issue has existed for as long as it has
without any substantial prior acknowledgement of such a heinous
defect. If the Electoral College negatively impacts the individuals
protected by those amendments, the Electoral College
undoubtedly would be an ancient relic of the invidious past, just
as literacy tests, poll taxes, white primaries, and abundant
violence are.
To say that the Electoral College is in the same category as
the aforementioned practices, and is thus subject to regulation by
the same amendments, is mere convenient political jiggerypokery. The Electoral College, assuredly being different in kind
than what the voting and Civil War Amendments were conceived
to protect, cannot be regulated by such methods. Even if
regulation was permissible though, the NPVIC is a far cry from
the rational basis of those noble causes, let alone the quasi-narrow
tailoring required.205
The NPVIC would eradicate some States’ abilities, and the
values of others, to enforce their election rights. Any federal
regulation, including the interstate compact’s approval,
interfering with these rights is not predicated on any express
constitutional authorization of the federal government’s power.206
There is no conceivable basis in the Constitution or its
amendments authorizing such federal insight into this exclusive
State power. This would be an impermissible federal regulation
of a State’s constitutional powers under the Presidential Electors
Clause,207 and the Constitution generally.
The member States may have a more difficult time finding
friendly litigation, given they sought out the surrendering of their
rights voluntarily, but they are potentially not without recourse.208
While the more modern precedent does trend toward procedurally
204. See Faith Karimi, Why the Electoral College Has Long Been Controversial,
CABLE NEWS NETWORK, [https://perma.cc/XV9F-6J6G] (Oct. 10, 2020, 6:59 AM).
205. See Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 542, 545 (2013).
206. See generally U.S. CONST. art. I (laying out the powers of Congress).
207. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
208. See Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 798-99, 808 (1997); Washington v. Glucksberg,
521 U.S. 702, 720, 723 (1997).
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barring State suits against other States,209 a State is still capable
of suing another for infringement on its sovereign powers.210 This
is true even after that infringement occurs pursuant to joint
action.211 If the merits of the case are heard, the just outcome in
either instance (State v. State or State v. United States) favors the
right of the State to freely exercise its sovereign powers without
impediment from federal law or other State law.
To be as straightforward as possible: the right of the States
to control their election procedures is exclusive, as defined under
the Garcia framework.212 Any exclusive right may only be
abridged by the federal government if there is informed consent
to do so (evidenced by a clause in the Constitution or its
amendments).213 While there are clauses granting such power to
the federal government, these clauses are narrow and the powers
implicit.214 Moreover, the Electoral College is not at all related
to what these clauses are designed to remedy. Additionally, there
is no indication that the NPVIC can address these concerns; even
if it is determined they are present with the Electoral College. To
continue the medical analogy, there is at best informed consent
for the federal government to conduct as minimally intrusive a
procedure as possible to remedy an exceedingly unique condition.
The Electoral College is not an etiology of that unique condition
and the NPVIC is not that minimally intrusive procedure. If the
plain language and interpretation thereof is not sufficient to bar
the NPVIC, the legislative history of the Constitution and relevant
clauses may be persuasive.

209. See Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1900); Connecticut v. Massachusetts,
282 U.S. 660, 669, 674 (1931); Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 521 (1906).
210. Alabama v. Arizona, 291 U.S. 286, 291 (1934); South Carolina v. North Carolina,
558 U.S. 256, 268 (2010) (“That the standard for intervention in original actions by nonstate
entities is high, however, does not mean that it is insurmountable.”).
211. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 378 (1821) (“If [two or more
States] be the parties, it is entirely unimportant what may be the subject of controversy. Be
it what it may, these parties have a constitutional right to come into the Courts of the
Union.”); Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 731 (1838).
212. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 556 (1985).
213. Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 2316, 2334 (2020); Garcia, 469 U.S. at 549.
214. U.S. CONST. amends. XIV, XIX, XXIV, XXVI.
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2. Founding Era Thoughts and Examples

How the citizens of each State would be represented in the
federal government was discussed at length during the ratification
of the Constitution.215 Still, only a sparse mandate made it into
the final draft.216 Although it is the least desirable and most
speculative course of action, the lack of definitive text may
require a delving into the Founders’ minds and those who
followed. The framers defined the election powers of a
republican system of government as not being comprised by the
will of the people but rather the will of political bodies that
represent the people.217 This definition appears to be consistent
with the common understanding around the time of ratification.218
Beyond dictionary definitions, the understanding of a republican
government’s election can be demonstrated through the practical
applications of such a system cited by the Founders, namely
existing State constitutions at the time of ratification.219
For example, the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776
established a method for choosing the president and vicepresident of the State where the several counties of the State
would elect members of the general assembly and council
members.220 Those elected officials would then choose the
persons to fill the executive office of the State.221 Similar
processes of indirectly elected executives existed in every State
at this time.222 While these State examples of an executive
215. See MADISON, CONVENTION NOTES, supra note 85, at 284, 509.
216. Compare id., with U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 1, cl. 2.
217. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, supra note 156, at 198 (James Madison).
218. Republican Government, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (1st ed. 1891) (defining
Republican Government as “a government by representatives chosen by the people”); JOHN
BOUVIER, BOUVIER’S LAW DICTIONARY AND CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA 2902 (8th ed.
1914).
219. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 580 n.6, 584-86 (2008);
PA. CONST. of 1776, § 19; MD. CONST. of 1776 §§ 14, 25 (stating the governor of the State
is elected by vote of both houses of the legislature with the senate being elected by county
representatives and the general assembly being elected directly by the people); DEL. CONST.
of 1776 art. 7 (“A president or chief magistrate shall be chosen by joint ballot of both houses
. . . .”).
220. PA. CONST. of 1776, § 19.
221. Id.
222. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, supra note 156, at 195 (James Madison); see, e.g., MD.
CONST. of 1776 §§ 14, 25; DEL. CONST. of 1776 art. 7.
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election process are engaged in by the legislative bodies,223 the
Founders of the Constitution felt that the selection of a President
would be better assigned to an independent, single-purpose,
electoral body (as opposed to an executive elected by the
legislatures or the people directly).224 This conclusion was
reached after a full and frank discussion of the several election
processes available, including the potential use of a popular
vote.225 The framers also indicated their decision was predicated
on failed or failing foreign examples of direct democracies.226
The Founders’ definition of the Presidential Electors Clause
and the examples relied on to create the electoral system should
be more than dispositive of what the Constitution requires.
However, the philosophical ideas behind this portion of the
Constitution may be necessary to convince the most ardent
proponents of the NPVIC. The framers’ arguments on behalf of
the Electoral College generally entail three substantial areas.227
These are the avoidance of cliques, the separation of coordinate
branches, and electing the most competent executive officer.228
While the separation of coordinate branches in electing a
President is undoubtedly essential, in the context of a popular
vote, the first and the last concerns are the most relevant. Under
the first concern, the framers thought that a group or individual
could elicit the support of many individuals and improperly seek
out the presidency in a nationwide popular vote such that there

223. See MD. CONST. of 1776 §§ 14, 25; DEL. CONST. of 1776 art. 7; PA. CONST. of
1776, § 19.
224. MADISON, CONVENTION NOTES, supra note 85, at 509 (saying that an
independent electoral system would avoid the “great evil of cabal” because each slate of
electors would be states away from another).
225. Id. at 320-21.
226. See, e.g., id. at 268 (looking to the election of an executive in Poland); THE
FEDERALIST NO. 6, at 23-24 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Cary & James McClellan
eds., 2001) (discussing Sparta, Athens, Rome, and Carthage—saying “[t]here have been, if
I may so express it, almost as many popular as royal wars”).
227. See Tollar & Kimball, supra note 13, at 9; THE FEDERALIST NO. 85, at 452-53
(Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Cary & James McClellan eds., 2001); MADISON,
CONVENTION NOTES, supra note 85, at 268-69, 284.
228. See Tollar & Kimball, supra note 13, at 9; THE FEDERALIST NO. 85, supra note
227, at 452-53 (Alexander Hamilton); MADISON, CONVENTION NOTES, supra note 85, at
268-69, 284.
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could be no counter to a powerful individual playing on the
excitement of society.229 Specifically, it was said that:
The additional securities to republican government, to
liberty, and to property, to be derived from the adoption of
the plan, consist chiefly in the restraints which the
preservation of the union will impose upon local factions and
insurrections, and upon the ambition of powerful individuals
in single states, who might acquire credit and influence
enough, from leaders and favourites, to become the despots
of the people . . . .230

Or that the people “will be led by a few active and designing
men.”231 This would be aided by the fact that the larger States
would likely support a candidate from their State to the detriment
of any small State who opposed them.232 In essence, the fear of
cliques was the fear that someone could seize control through
force and fear, as individuals are more susceptible to
radicalization than separate and detached institutions.233 There
are cliques that the framers discussed composed not of the people,
but of the other coordinate branches.234 Again, this is not in direct
relation to the NPVIC.
The framers also feared that the people en masse would not
be capable of selecting the most competent candidate.235 This
was in part due to the lack of reliable and easily obtainable
information regarding national events.236 Indeed, the framers
229. MADISON, CONVENTION NOTES, supra note 85, at 268; THE FEDERALIST NO. 85,
supra note 227, at 452-53 (Alexander Hamilton).
230. THE FEDERALIST NO. 85, supra note 227, at 452-53 (Alexander Hamilton).
231. MADISON, CONVENTION NOTES, supra note 85, at 268.
232. Id. at 268, 284.
233. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 45 (James Madison) (George W. Cary & James
McClellan eds., 2001); THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 257 (James Madison) (George W. Cary
& James McClellan eds., 2001); THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, supra note 153, at 352 (Alexander
Hamilton); MADISON, CONVENTION NOTES, supra note 85, at 268.
234. THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, supra note 153, at 353 (Alexander Hamilton);
MADISON, CONVENTION NOTES, supra note 85, at 267 (describing Governor Morris’s
advocacy for a national popular vote to avoid an executive branch dependent on the will of
the legislature).
235. THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, supra note 153, at 352 (Alexander Hamilton); THE
FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 447 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Cary & James McClellan
eds., 2001); MADISON, CONVENTION NOTES, supra note 85, at 267 (Mr. Sherman saying
“[t]he [people] will never be sufficiently informed of characters”).
236. THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, supra note 235, at 447-48 (Alexander Hamilton)
(saying the people at large have no means to acquire personal observation of presidential
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talked repeatedly about the need for the electoral group to be
diverse enough to reference national issues as opposed to local
issues.237 The other half of this concern stemmed from the fact
that even if the people as a whole had the opportunity to be
informed, the information would not necessarily be accurate.238
At best it is second-hand knowledge of a candidate and at worse
it is akin to the game of telephone, even though a highly efficient
game of telephone, with all the underlying inaccuracies. To this
end, the framers said, “[a] small number of persons, selected by
their fellow citizens from the general mass, will be most likely to
possess the information and discernment requisite to so
complicated an investigation.”239
The framers and indeed the generations that followed
deemed, through implication of continued use despite significant
criticism,240 this system of election superior to a direct
democracy.241 However, the relevancy of their reasoning may
differ in the modern world. To answer the relevancy question, it
is necessary to look at the changes that have occurred since then
that might impact the historic rationales.
3. Social and Political Arguments Against a Popular Vote
You have to remember one thing about the will of the people:
It wasn’t that long ago that we were swept away by the
Macarena.242

candidates and all information that is received is filtered through the lens of trusted
individuals—albeit unelected—anyway); MADISON, CONVENTION NOTES, supra note 85, at
269 (Colonel Mason saying “it would be as unnatural to refer the choice of a proper character
for [president] to the people, as it would, to refer a trial of colours to a blind man”).
237. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 36, at 172-73 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Cary
& James McClellan eds., 2001); MADISON, CONVENTION NOTES, supra note 85, at 269.
238. THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, supra note 153, at 352 (Alexander Hamilton).
239. Id.
240. Albert J. Rosenthal, The Constitution, Congress, and Presidential Elections, 67
MICH. L. REV. 1, 1 (1969) (saying that the Presidential Electors Clause “has probably been
the subject of more proposed amendments than any other provision of the Constitution”).
241. See U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 1, cl. 2; U.S. CONST. amend. XII (changing the selection
process of Vice President but retaining the Electoral College).
242. Mark Dawidziak, Jon Stewart Blurs the Lines Between Jester and Journalist, THE
PLAIN DEALER, [https://perma.cc/G22T-FJDA] (Mar. 28, 2019, 12:49 AM).
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Some people in modern America may be taken aback by the
previous section’s idea that the general public is incapable of
discerning a proper presidential candidate. To support this
outrage, the speed at which news is provided could be noted.
Likewise, the presidential candidates’ coverage could be cited.
Regardless of either argument, however, political society as a
whole has not drastically changed, despite our increased access to
media.243 The presidential candidates do not visit or invest their
campaigning into more than just a few States,244 nor does the
available media generally provide one-on-one access to the
presidential candidates.245 We may know more about the world
around us now, but the accuracy of that information has remained
essentially unchanged.246 Some even argue that this surplus of
243. Compare Shawn Garvey, A Positive Look at Negative Campaigns, 8 LBJ J. PUB.
AFFS. 13, 14 (1996) (“[W]hat his opposition claimed would result if Jefferson won the
presidential election of 1800: ‘Murder, robbery, rape, adultery and incest will be openly
taught and practiced,’ warned the Federalist press[,]” and “[t]he 1884 presidential race . . .”
where “Cleveland, widely rumored to have fathered an illegitimate son, was targeted by a
Republican campaign attack song: ‘Ma, ma, where’s my pa? Gone to Washington, ha, ha,
ha’” and “[a] famous 1964 Lyndon Johnson campaign commercial began with a little girl
plucking the petals from a daisy. Within seconds, a nuclear explosion erupted in the
background, and a mushroom cloud enveloped the little girl.”), with Gabriel Tate, The MudSlingers: The Most Shocking Presidential Attack Ads Ever Aired, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 12,
2016), [https://perma.cc/NFR4-TPJS] (discussing a 1988 ad suggesting rapists and murders
would be freed upon election of the ad’s opponent and a 2016 ad suggesting that the ad’s
opponent lacked the fortitude to protect against “external threats to American security”).
244. 94% of 2016 Presidential Campaign Was in Just 12 Closely Divided States,
NAT’L POPULAR VOTE, [https://perma.cc/E6CS-UVBN] (last visited Jan. 29, 2021); Tollar
& Kimball, supra note 13, at 19-20 (discussing the history of presidential campaigning and
how geographically limited said campaigning has been).
245. Compare 1858 Debates, THE COMM’N ON PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES,
[https://perma.cc/AHC7-HSPL] (last visited Jan. 28, 2021) (stating that only 7 debates
occurred, all in one State, spanning only 3 months, with no crowd involvement in the 1858
Lincoln-Douglas debates), with 2000 Debates, THE COMM’N ON PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES,
[https://perma.cc/JD3J-NXCJ] (last visited Jan. 28, 2021) (explaining how only three
presidential debates occurred in 2000, in one month’s time, with minimal crowd involvement
in one of the three debates), and 2020 Debates, THE COMM’N ON PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES,
[https://perma.cc/754A-6RNW] (last visited Jan. 28, 2021) (describing how only two
presidential debates occurred in 2020, with no crowd involvement).
246. Janet A. Hall, When Political Campaigns Turn to Slime: Establishing a Virginia
Fair Campaign Practices Committee, 7 J.L. & POL. 353, 366 (1991) (stating that
“[c]ampaign falsity statutes . . . are generally unenforced”); Maximilian J. Mescall, Make
Campaign Coverage Great Again: Presidential Campaigns, the Pres, and the Rights of
Access, 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 1653, 1653, 1657 (2018) (stating “more Americans follow
the news” despite the fact that “journalists continue to act as moderators” as they did “[i]n
early American History . . . as ‘gatekeepers by adhering to a developed set of ethical
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information makes discerning the quality information from the
rubbish more difficult.247
That being said, it seems readily apparent that the current
system simply cannot continue without some modification.
Regardless of the system’s merits, if the social outcry is
substantial enough, the practical implementation becomes so
frustrated as to exhaust all hope of success. Recent events have
yielded a plethora of research into the average American’s
mindset and faith in the electoral process.248 Generally, the
verdict against the process is not pleasant.249 The need for a
trusted and reliable system of elections is arguably more
important than the actual process that occurs.
In that vein, any proposed system must be consistently
applicable and transparent. Likely, a successful system would not
be subjected to potential manipulation by a single individual or
small subset of society. Other concerns that have prevailed,
despite the erosion of time, include the possibility that cliques will
form and, as discussed above, the potential that the most
norms’”) (quoting Sonja R. West, The “Press,” Then & Now, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 49, 72
(2016)).
247. See Jean R. Sternlight & Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Good Lawyers Should be Good
Psychologists: Insights for Interviewing and Counseling Clients, 23 OHIO STATE J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 437, 449 (2008); Joan Deppa, Media Coverage: Help or Hindrance Symposium:
International Terrorism: Prevention and Remedies, 22 SYRACUSE J. INT’L. L. & COM. 25,
28 (1996) (discussing how too much media coverage after terror events may violate the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, confuse the facts, and encourage further violence);
Paul Carrington, Too Much Publicity, 27 TEX. BAR J. 75, 76 (1964) (explaining the “excess
of publicity has been called a ‘discredit to the American system of justice’”).
248. See Election 2020: Voters are Highly Engaged, but Nearly Half Expect to Have
Difficulties Voting, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Aug. 13, 2020), [https://perma.cc/4WBF-GCA6]
(researching the impact Covid-19 had on voter confidence) [hereinafter Election 2020:
Voters are Highly Engaged]; Nick Laughlin & Peyton Shelburne, How Voters’ Trust in
Elections Shifted in Response to Biden’s Victory, MORNING CONSULT (Jan. 19, 2021),
[https://perma.cc/3V8H-VH4M] (polling the impacts of violence and voter fraud on voter
confidence in the electoral system).
249. See Election 2020: Voters are Highly Engaged, supra note 248 (stating 49% of
voters believed it would be difficult to vote in the 2020 elections); Laughlin & Shelburne,
supra note 248 (stating only 27% of registered republicans “say they trust the United States’
election system either ‘a lot’ or ‘some’” as of January 10, 2021); Deep Divisions in Views of
the Election Process—and Whether It Will Be Clear Who Won, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Oct. 14,
2020), [https://perma.cc/G8AR-QCWZ] (stating that only 22% of registered voters, polled
from Sept 30 to Oct 5, 2020, are very confident that “[a]fter all the votes are counted, it will
be clear which candidate won the election”); Faith in Elections in Relatively Short Supply in
U.S., GALLUP (Feb. 13, 2020), [https://perma.cc/ZX7Z-AGRJ] (stating that only 30% of
Americans said they had confidence in the honesty of elections in 2016).
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competent candidate will not prevail.250 A foundation-era
concern that was only slightly voiced then but is far more
significant in modern times is voter suppression and the suffrage
of all citizens.251
The NPVIC does not, and cannot, protect against these
concerns. First, even if it practically does not achieve this
outcome, the NPVIC will most likely be perceived by a
significant portion of the Nation’s voters as a way of
disenfranchising their vote. This can be evidenced by the existing
arguments launched against the NPVIC,252 which can be expected
to intensify upon its potential adoption. Likewise, the NPVIC
cannot address the concerns for consistency and reliability
required of any electoral system. For example, a vast exodus from
or to a highly populous member-state could potentially drastically
alter the outcome of the NPVIC’s vote. This change would be
substantial and could occur rapidly without any limitation on how
frequently it could occur. This may seem far-fetched, but again,
the primary concern with an election system is how trusted and
reliable it is by the people, regardless of the actual capacity for it
to be altered. To its credit, the NPVIC could likely end the impact
of gerrymandering. It would do so by simply ignoring any sparse
or minority populations—an ironic example of the idiom “the
medicine is worse than the disease.” Another of the major
concerns that the founding fathers had was that cliques could be
raised to change the results of an election forcibly.253 This
250. See Tollar & Kimball, supra note 13, at 9; THE FEDERALIST NO. 85, supra note
227, at 452-53 (Alexander Hamilton); MADISON, CONVENTION NOTES, supra note 85, at
268-69, 284.
251. See MADISON, CONVENTION NOTES, supra note 85, at 286 (“There was one
difficulty however of a serious nature attending an immediate choice by the people. The
right of suffrage was much more diffusive in the Northern than the Southern States; and the
latter could have no influence in the election on the score of the Negroes.”).
252. Jonah Goldberg, Column: Scrapping the Electoral College Is a Bad Idea, CHI.
TRIB. (Sept. 16, 2020), [https://perma.cc/D4HC-P2GR] (suggesting intentional polarization
as the driving force behind the NPVIC and that it encourages populist control of a “handful
of large, highly urbanized states”); see also Curtis Gans, Why National Popular Vote Is a
Bad Idea, HUFFPOST (updated Mar. 7, 2012), [https://perma.cc/5QMK-HQS9] (suggesting
the NPVIC will “diminish voter turnout” and warning of the legitimacy challenges to an
NPVIC election); Chris Stirewalt, The Electoral College Dodges Another Bullet, FOX (Jul.
6, 2020), [https://perma.cc/R2VS-FJ5S] (warning “a national popular election in a nation so
vast and diverse would be a demagogue’s dream”).
253. MADISON, CONVENTION NOTES, supra note 85, at 268.
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concern was in part mitigated by the geographical distance that
existed between the electors in each State.254
The NPVIC brings all the relevant electors/election officials
into a significantly smaller geographic area and subjects them to
the “great evil of cabal” associated with direct political
pressure.255 In addition, the creation of a new election official
who seemingly has unfettered control to report the election
results256 likewise may establish cliques among these newly
founded chief election officials.
Regarding the competency of presidential candidates, this
concern has been launched with increasing frequency in modern
times.257 The NPVIC does not allow any enhanced observation
or determination of a presidential candidate’s competency other
than what is presently in place. Thus, this concern is not better
addressed after the enactment of the NPVIC.
Finally, the NPVIC does not address the disenfranchisement
that is already being alleged under the present election system.258
While this could be mitigated as an ancillary concern of any
election system (to be addressed more directly outside of election
law), at least one alternative to the NPVIC, proposed later, does
in fact address this concern.
As a result, the NPVIC, while no better nor much worse than
the current system in many ways, is almost assuredly not the best
overall solution. In addition to these specific and identifiable
concerns the NPVIC either fails to address or potentially brings
about, there exist other, more ambiguous sovereignty concerns
upon the NPVIC’s adoption. One such concern is that the erosion
of the distinction between the States reduces the ability to “try

254. Id. at 57, 509.
255. Id.
256. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-60-4002 (2019).
257. Miles Parks & Mark Katkov, What the 25th Amendment Says about Removing a
Sitting President, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Jan. 7, 2021), [https://perma.cc/5LSN-N6TY];
Marianna Sotomayor & Mike Memoli, Joe Biden Releases Medical Assessment, Described
as ‘Healthy, Vigorous’, NBC NEWS, [https://perma.cc/7CY8-QSV2] (Sept. 16, 2021, 2:41
PM); Jeannie Suk Gersen, We May Need the Twenty-fifth Amendment If Trump Loses, THE
NEW YORKER (Oct. 26, 2020), [https://perma.cc/UT95-4XQ8].
258. Block the Vote: Voter Suppression in 2020, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (Feb. 3,
2020), [https://perma.cc/SRD4-Z845]; How to Put an End to Voter Disenfranchisement,
RUTGERS TODAY (Nov. 2, 2020), [https://perma.cc/5VP2-N4HR].
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novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of
the country.”259
Given the general disdain that many Founders held for a
national popular vote and the potential pitfalls of such a system
that still exist today,260 there must be a highly persuasive reason
for the present idea that this system is necessary. The NPVIC’s
proponents suggest that something must be done. Regardless of
why, their reasons should be addressed thoroughly and
respectfully. The section below attempts to provide more
appropriate alternatives than the NPVIC.
IV. WHY DOES THE POPULAR VOTE MOVEMENT
EXIST AND WHAT ARE SOME ALTERNATIVES?
It appears that the popular vote is aimed at reconciling the
disparity between the outcome of an election and the outcome of
the people’s desire.261 After all, it is a cornerstone in our
Constitutional Republic that the will of the people is
controlling.262 Additionally, the motivation of the NPVIC’s
proponents may also be to broaden the focus of presidential
campaigning.263 In achieving these goals, it has been proposed
that the NPVIC is not an attempt to abolish the Electoral College
writ large. Instead, it is primarily concerned with eradicating the
winner-take-all provisions that presently prevail across the
Nation.264
259. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting); see also FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 788-89 (1982) (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting); Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 578-80 (1981); Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476, 505-06 (1957) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
260. See Tollar & Kimball, supra note 13, at 9; THE FEDERALIST NO. 85, supra note
227, at 452-53 (Alexander Hamilton); MADISON, CONVENTION NOTES, supra note 85, at
268-69, 284; see also supra Section III.B.2-3.
261. See Karimi, supra note 204; 5 of 45 Presidents Came into Office Without Winning
the National Popular Vote, NAT’L POPULAR VOTE, [https://perma.cc/3E9R-JVW5] (last
visited Oct. 24, 2020).
262. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 405-06 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Cary &
James McClellan eds., 2001).
263. How a Nationwide Presidential Campaign Would Be Run, NAT’L POPULAR VOTE
(Jun. 17, 2020), [https://perma.cc/ZU27-GNXT].
264. Michael Gonchar & Nicole Daniels, Is the Electoral College a Problem? Does It
Need to Be Fixed?, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2020), [https://perma.cc/X8W3-HGTE]; see also
Map of General-Election Campaign Events and TV Ad Spending by 2020 Presidential
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An advocate of the NPVIC more immersed in the nuances
might also suggest that it would eliminate the disparity in voting
power between the citizens of States based on population
differences (e.g., an occupant of California accounts for one vote
out of tens of millions in a State that only controls roughly nine
times the electoral votes of Arkansas, where a citizen accounts for
one vote among a few million).265 This disparity is further
exacerbated when comparing more disparate populations. Under
this argument the NPVIC would more accurately reflect the one
person one vote standard.
These motivations can be inferred from the direct words and
publications of those that advocate for the NPVIC or similar
national popular vote programs.266 Regarding the first concern,
several articles have been published admonishing the Electoral
College and discussing how the outcome of a particular election
did not reflect the popular vote when another candidate “won the
national popular vote by 2,868,518 votes.”267 Finally, regarding
the broadening of presidential campaigns, the NPVIC’s
proponents have said sullenly, “[t]he concentration of . . .
campaign events in just a few battleground states is nothing new
. . . .”268 It is advocated that the NPVIC will be the solution to all
these problems and more.
Now knowing the desires of those who advocate the NPVIC
specifically, and more generally those that support some form of
a popular vote, there must be a way to reconcile the Constitution’s
commands while simultaneously reaching the desires of its
Candidates, NAT’L POPULAR VOTE, [https://perma.cc/BE48-GN7Y] (last visited Jan. 4,
2021) [hereinafter Map of General-Election Campaign Events] (blaming the winner-take-all
laws for the lack of campaign diversity, among other qualms). Interestingly enough, the very
winner-take-all system the NPVIC allegedly loathes would likely be the inevitable outcome
of the NPVIC, except at a nationwide, rather than a statewide, scale—just a few populous
States would control the entire presidential outcome as opposed to a few densely populated
counties.
265. Distribution of Electoral Votes, THE U.S. NAT’L ARCHIVES & RECS. ADMIN.,
[https://perma.cc/6875-TQ37] (last updated Mar. 6, 2020).
266. See, e.g., Goldman, supra note 15, at 93-94 (“The Humphrey method, however,
would have modified the exaggerated Electoral College majorities . . . [and] would heighten
the need for [a] co-ordinated and widely distributed presidential campaign effort on a
national basis.”); How a Nationwide Presidential Campaign Would Be Run, supra note 263.
267. Nate Silver Calculates that a 3-Million Lead Only Gives Biden a 46%, NAT’L
POPULAR VOTE, [https://perma.cc/7NTG-AGKD] (last visited Jan. 4, 2021).
268. See Map of General-Election Campaign Events, supra note 264.
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opposition. The systems proposed below also try to remedy the
dangers of keeping the current system.
A. Ranked Choice Voting
Ranked-choice voting allows each present individual the
opportunity to exercise his or her voting rights more than once.269
This system is very similar to the way Iowa’s presidential DNC
Caucuses are conducted.270 Because the Iowa caucus system is
more developed, it will be the foundation for this section, and the
Ranked Choice Voting System will be briefly discussed toward
the end. The political parties of Iowa determine the presidential
caucus rules of that State.271 In the Iowa system, the voters will
initially physically divide the room (or attempt to replicate this
practice through technology) and locate themselves according to
their desired candidate.272 Then, if that candidate does not receive
a sufficient percentage of the total votes (ranging from 15-25%),
that same voter can realign to his or her next most preferred
candidate.273 This process is then used to select the political
delegate to elect a primary candidate.274
Transferring this system to a general presidential election
would essentially entail the same process. This process, however,
is incompatible with the current electoral scheme, which only
allots one vote per person.275 This is undoubtedly a significant
obstacle for this proposed election method. The only potential
saving grace for this idea is that there is no explicit Constitutional
mandate requiring one person one vote.276 Instead, the Supreme
Court has simply interpreted the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and
Nineteenth Amendments to require this.277 The Court also said
that this interpretation’s main objective was to ensure “every
269. See IOWA DEMOCRATIC PARTY, IOWA DELEGATION SELECTION PLAN 3 (2020).
270. Compare id., with ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A § 801 (2020).
271. IOWA CODE § 43.1 (1973).
272. IOWA DEMOCRATIC PARTY, supra note 269.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 6.
275. Gary v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963).
276. See generally U.S. CONST.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (requiring equal
electoral representation but not limiting such representation to a specified quantity).
277. Gary, 372 U.S. at 381.
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voter is equal to every other voter in his State[.]”278 Thus, if this
method was universally available to all eligible voters and
carefully crafted to avoid disparate voting power, there appears to
be no violation. This could also be likened to the runoff election
procedures, which have been deemed to comply with the one
person one vote mandate.279
However, it is for this complication alone that this proposed
system does not present a viable alternative to the Electoral
College as it stands now. Nevertheless, it is still a possible and
popular280 contender to the NPVIC, and thus, States could
potentially impose new laws in compliance with and recognition
of this system. Indeed, many States have already shown a desire
to radically change the electoral system in their respective
jurisdictions, as evidenced by the acceptance of the NPVIC and
its originating legislation.281
As previously stated, one State has adopted a general
presidential election model that mirrors the Iowa caucus
system.282 In Maine, as of November 2020, the candidates for
president go through several rounds in the selection process.283
After each round, the candidate with the smallest percentage of
votes is removed from the running, and the next round begins.284
This goes on until only two candidates remain, at which point the
candidate with the most votes wins.285 Each eligible voter
receives at least five ranks to place the candidates on the ballot
278. Id. at 380.
279. Minn. Voters All. v. Minneapolis, 766 N.W.2d 683, 690 (Minn. 2009); Dudum v.
Arntz 640 F.3d 1098, 1114, 1116 (9th Cir. 2011) (allowing runoffs, even when participation
was restricted to only a few eligible voters, to prevail in the face of unequal voting power
claims).
280. See, e.g., Ranked Choice Voting, YANG2020, [https://perma.cc/866P-9ZLL] (last
visited Jan. 28, 2021).
281. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-15-4.1 (2019); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-60-4002
(2019); D.C. CODE § 1-1051.01 (2010).
282. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 801 (2020).
283. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 801; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 723A(2); Timeline of Ranked choice Voting in Maine, FAIR VOTE, [https://perma.cc/9TAVL65G] (last visited Jan. 28, 2021) (Maine’s ranked choice statutory scheme was adopted for
State general elections in November 2016. Upon expansion to federal elections in 2018, it
faced a veto referendum petition, which suspended its implementation until it passed again
on the November 2020 ballot).
284. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 723-A(2).
285. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 723-A(2).
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(this can be expanded, but the minimum is five).286 Despite Rank
Choice Voting already being unanimously ruled in violation of
the Maine Constitution—because it violates the one person one
vote rule expressly mandated within—it has, like a phoenix, or a
cockroach, remained un-killable.287
Additional complaints have been launched against Ranked
Choice Voting Systems, aside from any constitutional complaints
that could be made.288 These generally attack this system’s
practical implementation.289 Many point to its implementation in
the 2020 Iowa Democrat Primary as evidence that this system
would be doomed from the beginning.290 Indeed, there is strong
credibility in the argument that the infrastructure necessary for
this system is far from available, and what we do have seems less
than capable. There is also the concern that an election system of
this nature would all but disenfranchise a voter who did not have
several hours to devote to an election.291
Given the aforementioned constitutional attacks a Rank
Choice Voting System would be subject to, as well as the practical
drawbacks of such a system, it is difficult to imagine this system
being able to reach the fundamental goals of any election system.
It provides no greater access to presidential candidates than the
current system, with the exception that in the distant future there
may be more candidates to choose from. As such, the people’s
opportunity to meet a candidate may be slightly increased. Again,
this interaction would almost assuredly be brief and as
286. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 723-A(4).
287. See Op. of the Justs., 162 A.3d 188, 210-212 (Me. 2017).
288. See, e.g., Maura Barrett & Ben Popken, How the Iowa Caucus Fell Apart and
Tarnished the Vote, NBC NEWS (Feb. 21, 2020), [https://perma.cc/NL8L-ZDKL].
289. See id.; Hollie Russon Gilman, The Democratic Party in Iowa Changes the
Caucus Rules. There Could be Controversy, WASH. POST (Jan. 31, 2020),
[https://perma.cc/456E-FTRR] (“For instance, as my research finds, the wealthier, more
educated and more able-bodied and -minded residents of Iowa are more likely to persuade
their fellow caucus-goers. Furthermore, participating in caucuses requires time and
resources. Even getting to the caucus—especially on a cold, snowy February night—can be
challenging, skewing who shows up. Particularly excluded are those with disabilities, nontraditional work schedules and child-care responsibilities. Moreover, the Iowa caucuses
have not always appeared to be transparent.”).
290. Sara Morrison, The Iowa Caucus Smartphone App Disaster, Explained, VOX
(Feb. 6, 2020), [https://perma.cc/9H76-MATC] (stating that “many precinct chairs didn’t use
the app at all, citing difficulty downloading or using it”).
291. Gilman, supra note 289.
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analytically meaningless as the shaking of hands (or bumping of
elbows) that occurs presently. This system is also subject to
manipulation simply by the inherent complexity. In that same
vein, this system’s trust and reliability have already been called
into question,292 and there has yet to even be a substantial
implementation of a Rank Choice Voting System.
Because of the uniqueness of a Rank Choice Voting System
and similar election processes, it is difficult to determine how this
would specifically reach the goals sought by the NPVIC. That
being said, thinking in the abstract, it would allow for a varied
vote, with potentially lesser-known candidates having a larger
constituency and greater potential to actually secure the
presidency. This system would also almost certainly broaden the
scope of campaigns given its ability to divert attention from the
two major political parties in the United States. While there does
not appear to be any numerical benefit to the voters’ desire
compared to the election’s outcome, increased representation may
nonetheless occur. It would be procured by giving the voters
more opportunities to elect nuanced candidates and, in turn,
would require candidates to give more attention to secure States
if they stand a chance at winning. The electoral systems in place
presently would largely remain unchanged (the Electoral College
slate would still vote for the candidate who won the State’s
popular vote).293
As has been previously stated, this hypothetical alternative
to the NPVIC is highly speculative at best. The practical impact
of using an Iowa caucus/Ranked Choice model in the general
presidential election would be just as unpredictable and possibly
illegal as the NPVIC. However, this system has the distinct
advantage of only requiring States to change their laws
independently, which can be done according to the State’s powers
highlighted in Chiafalo.294 Notably this means that no interstate
compact is required.
Because of this model’s ambiguity, it may best be retained
only as a last resort. The proceeding systems are far more
292. See Barrett & Popken, supra note 288; Morrison, supra note 290; Gilman, supra
note 289.
293. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-8-302(2) (2021).
294. See Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 2316, 2323-24 (2020).
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concrete and seemingly reach the same goals as the NPVIC, but
through legal means.
B. Proportional Electorate Systems
There have been several proposals over time that could
potentially reduce the discrepancy between the outcome of a
State’s popular vote and the State’s allocation of electoral votes.
Most of these systems incorporate some kind of proportional
distribution of a State’s electoral votes based on each district’s
popular vote.295 This section will specifically discuss the method
employed by Nebraska as well as a new system coined by Eric T.
Tollar and Spencer H. Kimball in their article, A More Perfect
Electoral College: Challenging Winner-Takes-All Provisions
Under the Twelfth Amendment.296
Both of these propositions are defined by their rejection of
the Winner Takes All (WTA) provision existing across most
States.297 The WTA system requires all of a State’s Electoral
College votes to go to the candidate who won a majority of the
State’s popular vote.298 Instead, the Nebraska system allocates
each congressional district’s electoral votes to the candidate that
won the majority of the popular votes in that district.299 Then the
electoral votes that extend from that State’s senate seats as
opposed to their district/house of representative seats go to the
State’s overall winner.300
This electoral system has been criticized in large part for its
susceptibility to gerrymandering.301 It is proposed that another
electoral system, while similar in function, gets around many of
the deficiencies in the Nebraska system. This is the system
developed by Eric T. Tollar and Spencer H. Kimball, called the
Proportional Election Manner (PEM), where the State’s electoral
votes are divided based on the percentage each candidate received

295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.

Tollar & Kimball, supra note 13, at 25, 29.
Id. at 29.
Id. at 25, 29.
Id. at 20; see, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-8-302(2) (2021).
NEB. REV. STAT. § 32-714(2) (2015).
NEB. REV. STAT. § 32-714(2).
Tollar & Kimball, supra note 13, at 26.
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in the State’s popular vote.302 When this results in a fraction of
the electors, the number of electoral votes is rounded down to the
nearest whole number, and the winner of the State’s popular
election overall is awarded the remainder.303
Both of these systems seek to meet the demands of the
NPVIC in roughly the same way. In each process, the WTA
system is replaced with a proportional vote,304 and thus the
people’s vote theoretically becomes more influential in
determining who their electoral representative votes for.
There is potential in both systems to alter the scope of
presidential campaigning; however, the scope will not necessarily
be broadened. Instead, the focus will simply change from swing
States to the States that employ these methods. This can be
evidenced by Nebraska’s present attention (and Maine’s
historically, until the recent repulsion of this electoral system).305
If every State of the Union were to adopt these same methods, the
outcome would be similar to the NPVIC’s adoption in this regard.
In other words, a candidate would likely invest campaign
resources into swing districts or other highly populated areas
instead of a variety of States. The States adopting these solutions
may see an increase in political importance or campaign coverage
akin to swing States (assuming only a few States adopt these
methods), but these proposed alternatives do not solve the
problem of isolated campaign focus. In addition to meeting the
concerns the NPVIC seeks to address, these proportional systems
account for some, but not all, of the underlying goals of any
election system.
For starters, they have no mechanism for providing the
citizens increased interaction with presidential candidates aside
from potentially broadening the campaign locations. However,
302. Id. at 29.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 25; NEB. REV. STAT. § 32-714(2).
305. See Map of General-Election Campaign Events, supra note 264 (“The single visit
to Nebraska and the 2 events to Maine were motivated by the fact that those states award
electoral votes by congressional district. Although the statewide result is not in doubt in
either state, the 2nd congressional district of Nebraska (the Omaha area) and the 2nd
congressional of Maine (the northern half of the state) were closely divided. These campaign
events were held in those particular districts, and the remainder of both states received no
attention.”).
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these systems adequately address the trust, reliability, and
transparency issues to the same extent the present electoral
system does. Finally, they seemingly do not increase the risk of
manipulating the electors or the risk of cliques forming. It should
also be noted there is likely a practical bar to the implementation
of these systems. That is, the dominant political party in each
State has no incentive to relieve its State of its control, even
partially, without the rest of the nation reciprocating the sacrifice.
For this reason, it is unlikely these systems will slowly be tested
State to State. Furthermore, if adopted all at once, the problems
of overuse would quickly become apparent.
The systems above more or less maintain the current
system’s status quo. The changes they propose are substantial
and could potentially alter presidential elections to address the
grievances put forth by the NPVIC’s proponents; however, many
of these changes would likely lose all effectiveness shortly after
implementation due to overuse. In addition, these proportional
methods fail to stand toe-to-toe with yet another proposed
method, as seen below.
C. A Second Look at the Source Material
Historically, each State’s presidential electors were the only
names on a presidential ballot, if the people’s input was
considered at all.306 The elected individuals would then convene
in their States to select the president on behalf of their
constituents.307 There was no decree contemplating who they
were to vote for, nor any other mandatory indication except their

306. Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 2316, 2326 (2020) (“In some States,
legislatures chose the electors; in others, ordinary voters did.”); Joel K. Goldstein, Electoral
College: Is it a Dinosaur that Should be Abolished or a Last Bastion of Democracy?, 20
UPDATE ON L. RELATED EDUC. 34, 35 (1996); Keith E. Whittington, Originalism,
Constitutional Construction, and the Problem of Faithless Electors, 59 ARIZ. L. REV. 903,
906 (2017) (“Early in the nation’s history, the political parties provided ballots to voters to
cast in the election, and those early presidential ballots simply listed the names of the
presidential electors pledged to vote for that party’s presidential nominee.”); Rosenthal,
supra note 240, at 4.
307. U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 1; U.S. CONST. amend. XII; Rosenthal, supra note 240, at 4
(“[T]he electors are still chosen on a state-by-state basis, and in turn, they elect the
President.”).
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perceptions and beliefs about the candidates.308 Since that time,
States have continually and gradually reduced the discretion that
these electors have to cast their ballots.309 This process largely
began after the election of 1800 when the electors sought to
disrupt the election of the president by spreading their votes
between the president and vice president evenly such that the
decision would be controlled by Congress, which at the time was
composed of the electors’ favorable political party.310 The
Twelfth Amendment wholly remedied this problem.311
Nevertheless, many statutory schemes are presently in place
to prevent the exercise of discretion by electors.312 This includes
the WTA system, which directs all electors to vote for the
candidate who won the statewide popular vote,313 and faithless
elector statutes, which bar deviation from the result of the
statewide popular vote.314 The NPVIC is yet another attempt to
regulate electoral discretion but instead favors the national
popular vote outcome.315
While electoral discretion is certainly not perfect, if it were
to be allowed, as it once was—with the duly elected individuals
having complete discretion316—it would likely meet many of the
problems contemplated by the NPVIC, as well as other problems
the NPVIC fails to address. For starters, the implementation of a
308. Goldstein, supra note 306, at 35; Rosenthal, supra note 240, at 4 (stating that the
lack of electoral discretion common today “would have been unrecognizable to the
Framers”). But see Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 2323 (suggesting that upon the advent of political
parties, the electors of each State were under a strong expectation “to support the party
nominees”) (quoting Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 228 (1952)); Whittington, supra note 306,
at 911 (comparing the Electoral College and Presidential Electors Clause to “Chekov’s gun”
in the sense that it falsely indicates that electors are free to choose when they are in reality
“instruments for expressing the will of those who selected them”).
309. Rosenthal, supra note 240, at 14.
310. Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 2327.
311. U.S. CONST. amend. XII (resolving the issue by dictating that if no candidate for
the presidency received a majority of the votes, “then from the persons having the highest
numbers not exceeding three on the list of those voted for as President, the House of
Representatives shall choose immediately, by ballot, the President.”).
312. Rosenthal, supra note 240, at 22-23.
313. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-8-302(2) (1969).
314. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-212 (1979); CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 6906,
18002 (1994).
315. 17 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 17-4.2-1 (2013).
316. Goldstein, supra note 306, at 35; Rosenthal, supra note 240, at 17. But see
Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 2323; Whittington, supra note 306, at 911.
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direct election of electors rather than a direct election of the
president would allow for the electors of a person’s State to hold
a more intimate connection with their constituents and to
zealously advocate for the issues important to their people on the
national stage. This would reduce the number of people vying for
a candidate’s attention by increasing focus on the chief issues in
various States.
Paired with the newfound impossibility of the WTA system,
electors could make independent and informed value judgments
about candidates. In the process, this would also level the
disparity of power between the single voters in each State.
Functionally, that power would become indirect. Electors would
be free to vote for the candidate they feel is the most
representative of their constituency after having a personal
connection with the people, as well as the candidate. This system
allows the will of the people of every State to be explicitly heard
through their liaison.
Additionally, the votes, occurring at a far more local level
than state or nationwide scale, will almost certainly be more
representative of the elector chosen to represent a specific district.
This proportional representation is precisely what the Nebraska
and PEM methods seek to accomplish.317 This is because the
people are voting as a specific district, which gives less of an
opportunity for a densely populated area to overrule the rest of the
State or the Nation.
This system also has the potential to alleviate even the most
sinister gerrymandering by requiring the independent thought of
an elector. No, the elector likely would not sway from his or her
partisan affiliation, but the elector is at least subject to moral
accountability. This system also reduces the incentive to
gerrymander in the first place. Even a partisan sweep (occurring
when every elector is from the same political party) cannot ensure
a statewide victory for a single candidate, and the majority is no
longer dispositive of the entire State’s electors.
Likewise, a presidential candidate’s campaigning will be
broadened, albeit not geographically, but rather by the specific
and targeted issues raised by the electors representing the entire
317. Tollar & Kimball, supra note 13, at 25, 29.
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United States. The presidential candidates would no longer have
to campaign or rally to mass crowds of thousands of people,
greeting only ten or so before being shuffled away. Instead, a
candidate could sit down with 538 people or less throughout a
campaign, with each person chosen to be the best representative
of their community’s interests. Likely to be a televised event, this
would almost assuredly be more representative of a candidate’s
actual capacity compared to a candidate addressing a partisan
crowd chanting their name or waving their flags. While the
electoral representative would undoubtedly be as partisan as the
populations he or she represents, the decreased number of people
would give the candidate time to address opposing views in an
actual conversation instead of merely spouting the same rhetoric
to a different crowd.
The American people commonly appoint representatives to
control substantial aspects of their lives, including but not limited
to a person’s literal life and death. To think that presidential
electors should be treated any differently is to ignore the
foundations of the United States and to laugh in the face of the
men and women who already see to it that the rights of the people
reign eternal.
The potential adoption of this plan, it should also be noted,
is more likely than any other proposal. This is because the
adopting State’s political party does not need to cede its control.
The electors, now directly chosen by the people, will likely have
similar, if not the same, partisan affiliations as they did before
adoption. The difference is that they are no longer bound in the
same way they were before. It is in no way realistic to expect
members of a political party to uniformly abandon said party,
except in the most abhorrent of circumstances. They will likely
vote along the same partisan lines, but now for the candidate most
acutely after their own district’s heart. As a result, there is not the
same incentive to shy away from this legislation by the dominant
political party as there is with the other potential electoral
systems. Likewise, to those States seeking to avoid the seemingly
inevitable NPVIC, this system presents a viable alternative.
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CONCLUSION

The national popular vote movement and, more specifically,
the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact has been gaining
attention.318 It likely will continue to gain attention and support
in the years following this Comment. The NPVIC requires
congressional approval, which it has yet to receive, if it is
constitutionally permissible.319 However, even if congressional
approval is tendered, it is unlikely that the compact can be
sustained.320 The States could challenge the federal government
and the compact under the notion that the States have a right to
participate in the federal election process.321 Under the precedent
set by the Supreme Court in Garcia and other cases, this right is
evidenced by the structure of the Constitution and the explicit
federalism concerns stated within.322 This view is also compliant
with the historical teachings recorded at the Nation’s inception.323
Additionally, there are practical social and political reasons not to
implement the NPVIC or a similar election method.324
Despite the NPVIC’s many faults, the motivation behind it
is presumptively virtuous.325 As a result, alternative methods to
reach the same goals have been proposed.326 Two of the proposed
methods are better suited, right off the bat, for use in the United
States, given their possible compliance with the Constitution.327
With a third likely to avoid Constitutional preclusion until it is in
practice. However, there are many other differences between the
alternatives and the NPVIC.
318. Id. at 28.
319. MADISON, CONVENTION NOTES, supra note 85, at 201; see also supra Part II and
accompanying text.
320. Chiafalo, 140 S. Ct. at 2323-24; Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469
U.S. 528, 551 (1985); see also supra Section III.B.1. and accompanying text.
321. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 406 (1821); Alabama v. Arizona, 291
U.S. 286, 291-92 (1934); see also supra Section III.A. and accompanying text.
322. See supra Section III.B.1. and accompanying text.
323. See supra Section III.B.1. and accompanying text.
324. See supra Section III.B.2. and accompanying text.
325. See supra Part IV and accompanying text; Karimi, supra note 204; 5 of 45
Presidents Came into Office Without Winning the National Popular Vote, supra note 261.
326. See supra Sections IV.A-C. and accompanying text.
327. See generally U.S. CONST; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (requiring equal
electoral representation but not limiting such representation to a specified quantity); Tollar
& Kimball, supra note 13, at 25, 29.
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Under the Rank Choice proposal, providing variety in
campaigning and better representation would be achieved. That
being said, this method is undeniably speculative, despite the
minimal changes to state law that would be required for
implementation. Proportional systems, of varying degree and
kind, all adopt proportional representation of the Electoral
College’s votes and seemingly meet many of the proposed goals.
However, they are mainly effective only when used by a few
States. In other areas, they merely maintain the system, and all
its faults, in place today.
Finally, a return to the original method of presidential
elections would provide the people the most representation,
would not require a significant change in existing laws, could be
implemented effectively throughout the nation, and would secure
the propriety of elections and the will of the people for centuries
to come. If we are to truly accept that some truths are self-evident,
we should strongly consider an election system that derives from
the consent of the governed.

